Secure communication is a matter of genuine concern that includes means whereby entities can share information without a third party's interception.
Introduction
Over the last few decades, chaos-based cryptography has been studied extensively. A chaotic system is associated with particular properties such as sensitivity to parameters and initial conditions, pseudo-randomness, and ergodicity. These properties fulfill several certain features such as diffusion and confusion that are required in modern cryptography. The sensitivity to initial conditions and pseudo-randomness of Chebyshev map makes it prominently used in encryption schemes, hash functions, and particularly in key agreement protocols. A key agreement protocol is a protocol in which two or more communication parties create a shared key by using the messages they have sent to one another. Then, this shared key, called a session key, will be used for information encryption/decryption in subsequent communications. Whitefield Diffie and Martin Hellman [1] developed and then registered the first key agreement protocol. However, their protocol failed to provide mutual authentication between communication parties, and, therefore, was vulnerable to man-in-themiddle attack. Since then, several key agreement protocols have been designed to prevent man-in-the-middle and related attacks.
Kocarev and Tasev [2] proposed a public-key encryption scheme based on chaotic maps. Bergamo et al. [3] pointed out that Kocarev-Tasev's presented protocol is insecure, due to the cosine function periodicity, an adversary is able to recover the plaintext from a given ciphertext without any required secret key. Xiao et al. [4] designed a novel key agreement protocol upon which Han in 2008 [5] presented two attacks that enables an adversary to prevent the user and the server from establishing a shared key. Furthermore, Xiang et al. [6] pointed out that Xiao et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to the stolen-verifier attack and the off-line password guessing attack. Later, Han and Chang [7] presented an enhanced protocol, which worked with or without clock synchronization.
In 2010, Wang and Zhao [8] proposed a modified chaos-based protocol. Yoon and Jeon [9] proved that Wang-Zhao's protocol requires timestamp information and is vulnerable to illegal message modification attacks. In addition, it has redundant encryption/decryption computations so as to establish a secure key agreement protocol.
It is noteworthy, that none of these protocols is able to protect the anonymity of users over communication channels, whereas in many fields such as electronic commerce, electronic banking and remote Telecare Medicine Information Systems, users should retain their privacy while communicating with the servers.
Therefore, in 2009, Tseng et al. [10] presented the first key agreement protocol with user anonymity. Later, Niu and Wang [11] pointed out that it fails to provide user anonymity, perfect forward secrecy, and security against an insider attacker, then proposed a new key agreement protocol. Soon, Yoon [12] proved that Niu-Wang's protocol is vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attack and is fraught with computational problems. Tseng and Jou [13] suggested a key agreement protocol based on chaotic maps, which allows users to interact with the server anonymously. Over the recent years, key agreement schemes using smart cards have received a lot of attention. Das [14] proposed a protocol using smart cards, and claimed immunity to attacks. However, Lee and Hsu [15] showed it vulnerability to privileged insider attack and off-line password guessing attack and inability to protect the identity of users which resulted in a new modified protocol. Moreover, Lee et al. [15] proposed a protocol using smart cards but unfortunately, He et al. proved that Lee et als protocol is vulnerable to privileged insider attack, Denial of Service attack, and fails to protect the anonymity of users and as a result proposed a new protocol [16] .
In this paper, first, we offer a review of Yoon-Jeon's protocol and examine its failure to protect the identity of users while determining a shared session key, redundant encryption/decryption computations and trusted third party whose presence causes delay, sensitivity, and cost increase in a network. We propose an enhanced key agreement protocol to overcome these problems. This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a description of the Chebyshev chaotic map, Logistic chaotic map, and the Chinese remainder theorem. In section 3, we study Yoon-Jeon's key agreement protocol. In section 4, we introduce a novel, secure key agreement protocol with user anonymity and then analyze the security and efficiency of the proposed protocol in section 5.
Finally, we conclude in section 6.
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some concepts used in our protocol, such as the Chebyshev chaotic map, the Logistic chaotic map, and the Chinese remainder theorem.
Chebyshev chaotic map
Definition 1. Let n be an integer and x a variable over the interval −1, 1 . The degree-n Chebyshev polynomial for x, is defined using the following recurrence relation:
where n ≥ 2, T 0 (x) = 1 and T 1 (x) = x. Some examples of Chebyshev polynomials are:
Definition 2. Let n be an integer and x a variable over the interval − 1, 1 .
The polynomial T n (x) = − 1, 1 − 1, 1 , is used as:
Definitions 1 and 2 are equivalent. Chebyshev Polynomials have two important properties, they are semi-group and chaotic.
Definition 3. The semi-group property: One of the most important properties of Chebyshev polynomials is the semi-group property, which is defined with: Definition 5. Enhanced Chebyshev polynomial: Zhang [17] proved that the semi-group property holds true for Chebyshev polynomials in the interval (−∞, +∞).
Enhanced Chebyshev polynomials are defined as:
where, n ≥ 2, x ∈ (−∞, +∞) and N is a large prime number. Definition 7. The discrete logarithm problem (DLP): DLP is defined as: an element a is assumed, finding the integer r so that T r (x) ≡ a is impossible.
Logistic chaotic map
One of the simplest chaotic maps is the Simple Logistic Function (SLF). It can be expressed as:
where, n = 0, 1, 2, 3, · · · , x 0 ∈ [0, 1] is an initial value, x n the nth value in the sequence, accordingly, x n+1 the n + 1th term in the same sequence and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 4 the logistic map parameter. When we adjust the λ parameter beyond 3.57, we see the onset of chaos. In fact, for a behavior to be chaotic, λ should be between 3.57 and 4.
Chinese remainder theorem
The Chinese remainder theorem or CRT for short, has been employed vastly in cryptography. This algorithm hides data and is hypothetically designed as a one-way function. The theorem is described as: suppose m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m r are positive integers that are pairwise co-prime numbers and a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a r is the sequence of the given integers where:
. .
, · · · , r has only one answer to the module M = r i=1 m i and equals:
where
Yoon-Jeon's key agreement protocol based on Chebyshev chaotic map
This section reviews the Yoon-Jeon protocol [9] . All the notations used in the Yoon-Jeon protocol are described in Table 1 . Assume Alice and Bob are two participants in a key agreement process. In this system, Trent is a trusted third party in the network, e.g., KDC (key distribution center) which publishes the system parameters including Chebyshev polynomials, E(.), D(.), and H(.)
prior to the commencement of key agreement protocol and also shares a different secret key with each participant. The protocol is as follows:
1. Alice selects a large integer r, a large prime number N , and a random number x ∈ (−∞, +∞), and then computes T r (x), where, T r (x) is a ndegree Chebyshev polynomial in x. She concatenates A, B, x, N and T r (x). and sends it to Bob.
Having received the message, Bob computes M AC
and checks whether M AC A and M AC A are equal; if so, the identity of Alice is authenticated.
Therefore, Alice and Bob have achieved the shared session key k = T r (T s (x)) = T s (T r (x)) = T rs (x) in order to protect the exchanged information in subsequent communications.
An absolute trust in the key distribution center is presumed in the above protocol. Private keys are issued by the key distribution center for the server and users. Nevertheless, the possibility of encrypted message abuse by the center exists, and it is clear that determining a trusted third party is difficult. Each complete execution of the key agreement protocol requires two encryptions and two decryptions. Also in the first step of the protocol, the adversary can obtain the user's ID, thereby compromising the true identity of the user.
The proposed protocol
In this section, we introduce an efficient and secure key agreement protocol based on chaotic maps which protects the users' anonymity. It incorporates two phases of registration and authentication-key agreement. The notations used in our protocol are listed in Table 2. 1. Registration phase (a) U i chooses a large integer n, a random parameter λ over the interval 3.57, 4 and an initial value x 0 over the interval 0, 1 so as to generate the chaotic sequence A = (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n ) using Logistic mapping.
She also selects a positive integer m 1 , a password pw i and a random nonce n s . Now, she sends ID i , a, m 1 , h pw to the server over a secure channel, where ID i is the identity, a sum of all the elements in A and h pw = H(pw i , n s ).
(b) Similar to the server U i chooses a large integer n , a random parameter λ over the interval , an initial value x 0 over the interval 0, 1 so as to generate the chaotic sequence B = x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n using logistic mapping. Having acquired b which is the sum of elements in the chaotic sequence B, the server proceeds to obtain b and a by multiplying a and b by 10 c and 10 c where c and c are 2. Authentication-key agreement phase (a) U i selects a large integer r, a large prime N , and a random number
x ∈ − ∞, +∞ , and then computes T r (x), a n-degree Chebyshev polynomial in x. Then she computes the parameters below by choosing a random nonce k.
Finally, she transmits M i , M 1 , M 2 , AID i , x, N to the server. = AU i , and if it is accurate, the identity of user i is established. Now that the mutual authentication between the user and the server is established, the key sk i = T r (T s (x)) = T s (T r (x)) is used as the shared secret key between these two participants.
Analysis of the proposed protocol
The performance and security of the proposed protocol is now studied. The theory analysis demonstrates that the offered key agreement protocol is secure and efficient.
Security analysis (a) Bergamo et al.'s attack [3]
This attack is possible under two conditions. First, an attacker is to acquire the related parameters x, T r (x) and T s (x), second, if several Chebyshev polynomials cross the same crossing point, due to the periodicity of cosine functions, the adversary would be able to recover the encrypted text. In the proposed protocol, T r (x) and T s (x) are Therefore, our protocol is able to prevent these forms of attack. The authentication-key agreement phase is illustrated in figure 2 below.
(c) Replay attack
It is a form of network attack, in which a valid data transmission is maliciously or fraudulently repeated or delayed. This is carried out either by the originator or by an adversary who intercepts the data and retransmits it. The adversary eavesdrops on the conversation and having acquired the necessary information such as the user-name and password from the session, sends the password (or hash). For instance, supposing that the user U i wants to prove his/her identity to the server, the server requests the password as a proof of identity, which the user dutifully provides probably after some transformation like a hash function; meanwhile an adversarial third party is eavesdropping on their conversation and keeps the password. After the interchange is over, the adversary (posing as the user) connects to the server; and when asked for a proof of identity, sends the user's password (or hash) read from the last session, which the server accepts thus granting access to the adversarial third party. Ways to avoid replay attacks include using one-time passwords, (pseudo-) randomly generated strings (nonce), and time-stamping.
In our key agreement protocol's authentication step, to prevent such attacks, the ends of the communication system are supposed to confirm parts of the received messages. Second, the server acquires ID * i = H(k)⊕AID i and confirms the authenticity of the user. Third, the user U i , after receiving the message ID s , M 3 , AU s identifies the server and having found R i in its database, obtains H(X) =
and sk i T r (T s (x)), thus enabled to confirm the authentication key. Then, the server confirms The key agreement protocols are supposed to be dynamic so that each execution results in a unique session key. This feature ensures that if an adversary could access a session key, she would be unable to recover the other session keys. Thus, supposing an adversary could obtain a secret session key between the user and server, she would not be able to compute the other session keys because the adversary would face DHP and DLP . In addition, the created session keys are chosen by the user and the server, dependent upon random numbers of r and s, so they would be different in each protocol execution.
Thus, the inability of an adversary to gain random numbers of r and s, makes the session keys unattainable. Clearly, the proposed protocol satisfies this need.
(g) Privileged insider attack Adversaries frequently guess weak passwords using password cracker applications, which make attempts at guessing the passwords by using particular algorithms and keyword dictionaries. One of the most common and biggest mistakes is choosing one password for all accounts. In the first step of the proposed protocol, the user i chooses a random nonce n s while computing h pw = H(pw i , n s ), transmits it to the server, and h pw is substituted in R 1 = H(m 2 , h pw ) from the second step of the registration phase. It is impossible for a malicious server to guess the h pw password without identifying the random nonce n s , even if the user selected a weak password pw i that is easier to remember.
(h) User anonymity
In insecure environments such as e-commerce, e-banking, and telecare medicine information systems, when the users intend to agree upon a mutual key session with the server, they also wish to remain anonymous. Therefore, protecting the privacy of users is crucial in such environments, and the key agreement protocols are supposed to be designed in a way to make it impossible for an adversary to extract In order to conduct a practical analysis to make a reasonable comparison between protocols, it is required that all operational units are presented as one, therefore, the operational complexity of units is calculated according to the Hash function.
Based on the table, it is clear that the amount of computations in the proposed protocol in compariosn to related protocols has decreased, and there is no need for encryption and decryption computations, which resulting in efficiency improvement.
It is understandable from the security analysis that our proposed protocol does not suffer from complexity issues in encryption/decryption operations due to using XOR and Hash functions along with the Chebyshev chaotic map. Other protocols utilize encryption in transmission of their messages. Each encryption/decryption computation includes several Hashing and XOR operations. It is clear that all such protocols are afflicted with complexity issues and require more execution time than the proposed protocol.
Conclusion
Since reaching to a certain satisfying level of security with minimum computations in designing a protocol is of great importance, we offer a secure and practical protocol based on chaotic maps. In this protocol, we take advantage of:
the semi-group property of Chebyshev chaotic map for session key agreement between two participants, the logistic chaotic map for generating non-predictable and pseudo-random sequences, and the Chinese remainder theorem as a one-way theorem. The proposed protocol, in addition to better performance, reduces the setbacks inherent with previous related protocols such as non-anonymity and it does not require the presence of a trusted third party since this element holds the potential to introduce vulnerability. Furthermore, the implementation cost of a trusted third party and complex structure of these protocols are considered the main impediments of utilizing a third party in design and development of key agreement protocols. Thus, the presented protocol has proved to maintain a balance between security and implementation cost.
